Saturday, February 25, 2023

Attachment Theory, God Images, and Religious Exclusion

 

John Bowlby (1907-1990) pioneered what is known in psychology as Attachment Theory. His theory and research are found in a trilogy of books, the first of which was published in 1969. One of the interesting things about his theory is that it is still highly influential in the discipline of psychology. Numerous theoreticians have subsequently built on Bowlby’s work, and some have fruitfully applied Attachment Theory to the field of religious psychology.

            As humans have evolved as social creatures, there is a natural tendency for attachments to form, beginning in infancy. Unlike animals whose attachment occurs through the instinct of imprinting, humans form attachments over time towards those who they see and experience on a regular basis. Typically, this is the mother. But studies have shown that any other caregiver will do as long as there is a constant and consistent presence.
            Attachment theorists, building off the work of Mary Ainsworth, have categorized three general patterns of attachment in young children, A B and C. B types are those labeled secure. These are children who experience a moderate sense of distress when there is a separation from the mother. Because there has been a generally positive experience between the mother/caregiver and the child, the child is not overly distressed, having instilled a confidence in the return of the mother/caregiver.
Type A children are categorized as avoidant. The child manifests a type of indifference to the absence of the mother/caregiver, as most likely due to such previous and consistent behavior on the part of the mother/caregiver. However, in clinical studies, children are monitored for physical reactions, manifesting increased heart rates, indicating an internal distress over the mothers/caregivers absence.
Type C children are categorized as resistant, often also referred as anxious, ambivalent, or anxious/ambivalent. These types of children find separation from the mother/caregiver as highly stressful, and when the mother/caregiver returns manifests anger.
Bowlby maintained that children internalized these early attachment relationships, and these in turn became what he called Internal Working Models (IWM). This consists in how the child interprets and responds to the mother/caregiver’s behavior. This in turn will form cognitive and emotional structures shaping the sense of security in the individual’s relational experiences. This in turn will inform strategies of behavior and reaction to others. Lee Kirkpatrick writes in Attachment, Evolution, and the Psychology of Religion, “Bowlby argued that in early life, IWMs concerning the degree to which caregivers are reliable providers of love, care, and protection are linked inextricably to mental models of the self as worthy of love, care, and protection. As a consequence of cognitive development, along with more varied experience with individuals other than the primary attachment figure, the models of self and others can become decoupled.”
            Kirkpatrick makes a convincing argument, in my opinion, that one’s God, or god, acts as a type of attachment figure. He writes,
 
For many people in many religions, I suggest that this attachment system is fundamentally involved in their thinking, beliefs, and reasoning about God and their relationship to God. This strong position suggests that, beyond apparent (and potentially only superficial) similarities, our knowledge of how attachment processes work in other relationships should prove useful in understanding the ways in which people construe God and interact with God. How does one tell if God “really” functions psychologically as an attachment figure? A good place to start is by identifying the principal criteria for defining an attachment figure—specifically, criteria that distinguish attachments from other functionally distinct kinds of interpersonal relationships—and examine how well beliefs about God meet these criteria. Ainsworth (1985) summarized five defining characteristics that are widely acknowledged to distinguish attachment relationships from other types of close relationships: (1) the attached person seeks proximity to the caregiver, particularly when frightened or alarmed; (2) the caregiver provides care and protection (the haven of safety function) as well as (3) a sense of security (the secure base function); (4) the threat of separation causes anxiety in the attached person; and (5) loss of the attachment figure would cause grief in the attached person.
 
Kirkpatrick notes that Bowlby
 
identified three classes of stimuli hypothesized to activate the attachment system: (1) frightening or alarming environmental events, that is, stimuli that evoke fear and distress; (2) illness, injury, or fatigue; and (3) separation or threat of separation from attachment figures. If God functions psychologically as an attachment figure, then we should find that people turn to God, and evince attachment-like behaviors toward God, under these conditions. Moreover, the experience of God as a haven of safety in these circumstances should give rise to the same kinds of feelings of comfort and security provided by secure human attachments. In fact, considerable research suggests that these are indeed the very conditions under which people, at least in Western Christian traditions, are most likely to seek God's support and comfort. In their textbook treatment of the topic, Hood et al. (1996) conclude that people are most likely to “turn to their gods in times of trouble and crisis,” and list three general classes of potential triggers: “illness, disability, and other negative life events that cause both mental and physical distress; the anticipated or actual death of friends and relatives; and dealing with an adverse life situation” (pp. 386–387)—in short, the same list provided by Bowlby.

The experience of comfort from God in times of distress can be a lifesaver for many people. Attachment to a God/god of comfort, however else one’s image of God is filled out, can become something worthy of protection. Any challenge to one’s God image then can be an occasion of emotional distress, a fear of losing an important form of attachment that has been life sustaining.
            Attachment theory has some resonance with the mimetic theory of Rene Girard, in that the influence of a model, in this case the mother/caregiver, has an effect on the formation of the child’s worldview. Where mimetic theory goes further is in the model’s influence in the formation of more than just a sense of security, but the formation of desires, values, principles, cultural taboos, and social rules shaping attitudes and behavior.
The formation of God images is complex. It involves a myriad of influences on the individual’s consciousness. Of great influence is the impact that models have in the formation of God images. Such models are found in individual’s relational social space, i.e., parents, siblings, friends, famous people in history or contemporary, and so forth. Models can also be found in more abstract realities, such as institutions, i.e., government and church. It is important to recall Ainsworth's five defining characteristics of attachment: (1) the attached person seeks proximity to the caregiver, particularly when frightened or alarmed; (2) the caregiver provides care and protection (the haven of safety function) as well as (3) a sense of security (the secure base function); (4) the threat of separation causes anxiety in the attached person; and (5) loss of the attachment figure would cause grief in the attached person. God images are always formed with human conceptual constructs. We cannot escape this reality. This means that how we articulate our understanding of the divine is necessarily with the categories presented to us through social and cultural artifacts.
Thus, as we form a deeper and deeper attachment to our God images, we form a more binding attachment to the social and cultural influences that have shaped these images. We tend to become protective of these constructs, believing them to proceed from a divine, thus infallible, source. To question one’s image is to question the deity itself. As noted in characteristic (5) above, loss of an attachment figure can cause grief. This is why there is such a fear of death of a loved one, because it is an experience of absence. A void in the heart occurs and it reminds us of the fragility of life and relationships. We become creative in both our denial of death and in filling the void. However, when it comes to God images (even though destructive in some cases), we tend to fight against any threat to that which has given us a sense of security and comfort. Such an image is replete with the many value systems that attend to a particular God image, formed in the mimetic relationships of significant models, be they an individual, a group, or an institution. In terms of the institution, the principles, rules, taboos, conventions, morals, etc., that attend to one’s adherence to the institution, are protected as being ontologically intrinsic to the very nature of the divine.
Dylan Thomas railed against the dying of the light. Attachments to our God images is like attachments to our loved one’s – we can’t bare to see them end. We crave the security and comfort they give us. We will protect, fight, kill to keep at bay the dying of the light. But the fact is, all God images are metaphors, incomplete, and do not manifest the fulness of the divine. I John 4:16 tells us that God is love. Jesus told us to love one another. How do these statements form our God images? For some, God’s love must be protected against impurity, the ‘other’ who does not profess/confess accurately the true image of the divine that we have, in truth, constructed. The fact that any deity needs protection says a great deal both about the weakness of such a deity, and the implicit need to play God. Attachments to such a small deity will inevitably manifest in fear and anger.
So, my question to you. What is your God image? How does it lead to greater love, humility, empathy, or judgmentalism, condemnation, and bigotry?